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The paper focuses on the theoretical and empirical formulation of an entry model that 
integrates strategic considerations and firms’ heterogeneity.  Entry decisions are derived from 
a profit function, and, subsequently, the number of entrants is defined as the sum of firms that 
have effectively decided to enter a given industry. As the aggregation of individual entry 
decisions yields a discrete outcome, the econometric methodology is based on panel count 
data models, rendering a novel departure from previous works.  The results suggest that both 
incumbents’ behaviour towards entry and firm-specific characteristics provide additional and 





JEL: C23; C25; L10; L60 
Key words: entry; firms’ heterogeneity; manufacturing; panel count data models 
                                                 
∗ Post Address: Universidade do Minho, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal 
Fax: +351 253 676376 Phone: +351 253 604535 
e-mail address: natbar@eeg.uminho.pt 
This is a revised version of the paper that won the EARIE 2002 Young Economists Award Competion.  This award is 
granted to the best paper submitted by a young scholar to the annual conference of the European Association for Research 
in Industrial Economics (EARIE).  Financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (PRAXIS XXI BD 
11417/97) is also acknowledged. Additionally, I am grateful to DETEFP, Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, Portugal, for 
having provided access to the data used in this study.   2
1. Introduction 
The common wisdom of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on entry behaviour 
emphasises structural and strategic barriers to entry as the main determinants of the number of 
firms that each period enter a given industry.  However, there may be alternative, or even 
complementary, factors determining entry and industry structure; in particular, the possibility 
of heterogeneous firms (incumbents and entrants) with regard to costs, demand, and their 
ability to compete in the industry.  The empirical evidence of simultaneity in entry and exit 
flows in the same industry (cf. Dunne et al., 1988; Agarwal and Gort, 1996) is, in fact, 
consistent with heterogeneous firms.  If entry and exit are exclusively driven by variations in 
industry profitability, there is no explanation for the observed simultaneity. 
The efficiency-based perspective of industry dynamics recognises the relevance of 
firms’ heterogeneity as a driven force.  A superior competitive performance might be specific 
to the firm that has developed a differential advantage in producing and marketing its 
products (Demsetz, 1973).  Firms are heterogeneous in terms of efficiency and competitive 
capabilities, which would reflect on their competitive performance.  Therefore, the 
importance of firms’ heterogeneity as well as strategy-based arguments should be taken into 
account in entry studies. 
The objective of the paper is threefold.  First, it attempts to deepen the understanding 
of entry by specifying a model of entry behaviour that integrates structural, strategic- and 
efficiency-based arguments.  To fulfil it entrants’ profit determinants are split into three 
components: industry-specific characteristics, firm-specific characteristics, and incumbents’ 
strategic behaviour towards entry.  The profit or utility function forms the basis of entry 
decisions, which are assumed to be a discrete choice problem.  Second, it considers 
observable variables that make feasible the econometric testing of the entry model.  Third, a 
novel econometric approach based on panel models for count data is taken.  In particular, the 
paper applies panel count data models that attempt to lessen concern over the use of cross-
section data in industry analysis, mainly on account of omitted variables and/or measurement 
errors (c.f. Schmalensee, 1989), and to overcome the “statistical incongruence between 
industry profitability and entry” (Geroski, 1995: p. 428) by controlling for variation in entry 
behaviour between and within industries. 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 offers a brief review of previous works 
on entry modelling.  In Section 3 the entry model is theoretically formalised, while Section 4   3
discusses the variables to be used in the empirical application and delineates the propositions 
that will require attention in the remainder of the paper.  The empirical application is 
discussed in Section 5, by addressing the issues of data selection, econometric modelling, and 
estimated results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  An Overview of Previous Works in Entry Modelling 
The basic idea behind almost all entry models is that entry occurs whenever expected post-
entry profits are positive.  The work of Orr (1974) can be seen as one of the early empirical 
models of entry, incorporating the idea that entry intends to eliminate positive economic 
profits and that entry does not appear to be free.  The theoretical foundations are entry models 
that posit the limit-pricing hypotheses, in which entry is affected by certain industry's 
structural characteristics that have been described as erecting entry barriers and thereby 
perpetuating profit differences across industries.  The focus is on identification and 
measurement of barriers to entry, the entry flow being strictly conditioned by industry's 
structure.  No attempt is made to explicitly model potential entrants’ decisions with respect to 
entry.  The pool of potential entrants has no active role in determining the number of firms in 
a given industry. 
More recently, the focus on entry modelling has moved away from industry structure 
to concentrate on entrants’ decision process; in particular, on the specification of the 
underlying profit function that determines whether or not an entry decision would be taken.  
Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991) developed static equilibrium entry models that relate 
a profit function to firms’ entry decisions and allow them to assess the effects of entry, in 
particular, on firms’ competitive conduct.  The existing market demand is the key exogenous 
variable used to describe how entrants’ unobserved profits vary with changes in demand and 
market competition.  All firms exert identical competitive pressure and the equilibrium 
number of firms is, 
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where P(n) is the equilibrium price resulting from the entry of the nth firm, AC is its average 
cost function, C is a vector of exogenous variables affecting costs, q(n) the firm output, and S 
the market size proxied by the number of consumers.  B(n) ≥0 and b(n)≥0 are introduced on the 
profit function to allow for the possibility of the nth entrant having a strategic cost 
disadvantage.  These parameters aggregate theoretical implications from strategic entry   4
models; in particular, strategic interactions that may disadvantage entrants by increasing their 
costs of operating in the industry.  The equilibrium number of firms is determined by both 
industry characteristics and strategic behaviour that may put latter entrants at cost 
disadvantage. Note however that in the Bresnahan and Reiss long-run model of stable 
industry incumbents do not have any incentive to exit the industry and entrants’ cost 
disadvantages result mainly from the order of entry.  Moreover, the assumptions underlying 
that work may be empirically unrealistic as most of industries are not in long run stable 
equilibrium, being instead characterized by patterns of simultaneous entry and exit.  The 
possibility of firms (either incumbents or entrants) being heterogeneous in terms of cost 
structure and capability to compete within a given industry is not addressed in those works as 
well.   
Berry (1992), who follows Bresnahan and Reiss’ work, directly modelled 
heterogeneity among entrants by specifying firms’ underlying profitability as a function of a 
component that is common to all firms – vj - and another one that is firm specific - φij.  The 
profit function of firm i in industry j is expressed as  
πij=vj(N)+φij.  (2)
where the common component is a decreasing function of the number of firms, implying that 
entrant profits decrease with rivals’ decisions to enter, and rivals' specific characteristics 
affect entrant i profits via the equilibrium number of firms.  The relationship between a firm’s 
profits and its specific characteristics supports efficiency-based arguments in explaining 
entry.  Here, firms may possess competitive advantages by being themselves more efficient.  
A potential entrant is at disadvantage only if his specific characteristics do not allow him to 
achieve a level of efficiency equal to rival firms. 
3.  A Model of Entry 
This paper proposes an entry model that integrates strategic considerations arising from entry 
games and firms' heterogeneity resulting from differences in their capabilities and cost 
structures.  Contrary to the works previously discussed, we seek to develop an empirical entry 
model to understand the effects of incumbents’ conduct and firms’ heterogeneity on entry 
rather than the effects of entry on firms’ conduct and equilibrium profits.  Furthermore, our 
analysis will focus on the intensity of competition brought to an industry by new firms, 
measured by the number of entering firms, rather than on individual entry decisions.  The 
guiding concept of our entry model is a latent profit function for an entrant firm into a given   5
industry, which allows us to specify entry decisions and, by aggregation, the number of 
entrants. The unit of analysis is the industry. 
3.1 The  Main  Assumptions 
The entry model is based on the following assumptions.  Initially, at a time 0, each industry 
has N0 incumbent firms, which possess specific characteristics and may engage in entry-
deterring strategies.  During the period that lasts until time 0, one or more firms have the 
opportunity to make strategic commitments that will influence the post-entry competition.   
At the beginning of period 1, of length (0, T], firms contemplating entry in a given 
industry decide whether to enter or not.  Any entry decision, based on a process of gathering 
information and evaluating profitability, is taken if a firm expects positive post-entry profits.  
The evaluation of post-entry profits is conditional on the observed competitive environment, 
which is a result of industry-specific characteristics in terms of cost and demand conditions 
and past incumbents’ strategic behaviour, and on the expected post-entry incumbents' 
response to entry.  The information available at time 0 and their entry strategy, which can be 
inferred from the firm's characteristic at the moment of entry, allow firms to decide whether 
or not to enter.  Moreover, as potential entrants do not forecast perfectly what will happen 
after entry, we assume that they know and use all information available at time 0 to predict 
incumbents' future behaviour, even though the entrant's assessment may be later revised. 
The likelihood of future entry and its effects on profits are also critical to the entry 
decision.  At this point we make a simplifying assumption that an entrant cannot know or 
predict if, and how many, other potential entrants choose to enter in future.  Then its entry 
decision is based only on the number of firms that are considering entry during period 1.  
Regarding incumbents strategic behaviour, we assume that they anticipate entry and its effects 
on profitability and, as a result, choose the optimal entry-deterring strategy before time 0.  
This implies that we impose an exogenous asymmetry in the order in which incumbents and 
entrants move.  Any entry-deterring strategy is implemented and observed before entry 
occurs.  Hence, entrants correctly decide whether or not move into the industry.  The 
observation of effective entries occurs at the end of period 1 (i.e. at time T). 
3.2  A Functional Form of Profits and the Number of Entering Firms 
Inspired mostly by Berry's (1992) reduced form profit function, we specify that expected 
profits of a firm i entering in industry j (πij) have additively separable components of the 
form:   6
() W z x , h δ γ β + + = π i j ij ,  (3) 
where xj is a vector comprising observable industry-specific characteristics, zi a vector of 
observable firm-specific characteristics, reflecting entry strategies, and h(δ,W) is a function of 
explanatory variables to capture the relationship between expected profits and rivals' strategic 
decisions.  β, γ, and δ are vectors of unknown parameters.  Comparing (3) with (2), the 
component of profits common to all firms is here separated into industry’s structural 
characteristics (xj) and strategic aspects (h(δ,W)).  The specific index of profitability - φij - is a 
linear combination of firms’ characteristics (zi). 
The additive component h(δ,W) can be regarded as an extension of Berry's (1992) 
profit function.  Aside from industry- and firm- specific characteristics profits were specified 
as a decreasing function of the number of firms in the industry, i.e. h(δ,N), which accounts for 
an aggregated and unspecified effect of strategic interactions among firms.  Expected profits 
depend only upon how many firms simultaneously enter a given industry.  However, 
theoretical research examining how incumbents respond to the threat of entry has shown that 
both the number of incumbents and their strategic behaviour towards entry can affect 
potential entrants' profits and the magnitude of entry.  Thus, the component h(δ,W) in (3) 
aims to integrate both the interdependence of entrants' profits via the number of firms and the 
effect of incumbents’ strategic behaviour towards entry.  
The proposed entry model is based on entry threshold conditions.  Given (3), we 
define that a firm i will enter in the industry j whenever  0 ij ≥ π .  In a given period, the 
equilibrium number of firms is N
*
j, the largest element of the set of integer, n = (0, 1, ..., Nj), 
that satisfies the entry threshold condition.  Formally, the number of firms in the industry j is 
given by  
( ) () {} 0 : N n j
j N n 0
j ≥ + γ + β =
≤ ≤
W z x , h n max
* δ   (4) 
where n only takes integer and non-negative values and the total number of potential firms 
(Nj) is any finite number
1.  We could presume that there are an infinite number of firms 
contemplating entry into a variety of industries.  However, if entry into an industry, 
whichever it is, calls for specific or rare firm's characteristics, the supply of potential entrants 
is necessarily finite.  An infinite supply of potential entrants (i.e. Nj=∞) implies that all firms 
are identical and, as a consequence, equally profitable after entry.  Given that equation (4) 
                                                 
1 See Berry (1992) for a proof of the existence of equilibrium when firms are heterogeneous with respect to profitability.   7
explicitly allows for heterogeneous entrants, Nj must be a finite, but not necessarily a known, 
number. 
The concept of entry underlying model (3)-(4) is not restricted to moves taken by 
firms outside the industry.  In each period, all firms (incumbents or potential entrants) decide 
whether or not to be an operating firm within an industry.  This kind of decision is broadly 
understood as an entry decision.  In the case of already established firms, it means deciding 
whether to stay in or exit from the industry, while, in the case of new firms, it means deciding 
whether or not to be, for the first time, an operating firm in a given industry.  The equilibrium 
number of firms at the end of a given period of time - N
*
j - results from the aggregate 
outcome of all firms’ decisions
2. 
However, if the decisions facing incumbent firms were entirely identical to those of 
entrants, it would imply that there is no room for entry-deterring strategies.  At any time, the 
distinction between incumbents and potential entrants would be meaningless.  Aside from 
industry- and firm-specific characteristics, post-entry profits would depend only upon the 
number of firms that simultaneously enter, suggesting that incumbent firms do not attempt to 
take advantage of their previous presence in the industry.  They would not attempt to prevent 
or limit further entries by exploiting, if any, their first-movers' advantages.  This however 
appears to be an unrealistic presumption, at least on oligopolistic industries. 
To incorporate in entrants’ expected profits the effects of incumbents’ strategic 
deterrence, one has to assume that there is, at some extent, a time lag between incumbents’ 
decisions and new firms’ entry decisions.  Incumbents firstly decide whether or not to stay in 
an industry and then how to react to threats of new entries.  This sequential decision process 
for incumbents suggests that at time 0 potential entrants have an indication of incumbents’ 
entry decisions. 
As our objective is to understand what drives new firms to enter a given industry, we 
need to disentangle N
*
j from the equilibrium number of new firms – ENT
*
j – and the 
equilibrium number of already established firms.  Assuming the time lag between incumbents' 
and potential entrants' entry decisions, the number of incumbents that decide to stay operating 
in an industry is not an outcome of the current entry process and those two components of N
*
j 
can be additively separated.  Let 
*
, 1 j N −  be the equilibrium number of firms in industry j in the 
prior period and α∈[0, 1] the exogenous survival rate.  N
*
j can then be written as 
                                                 
2 Existing works treating identically incumbents’ and potential entrants’ decisions could be seen as explaining actual industry 
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where int(.) represents the integer part of α
*
, 1 j N − .  As with equation (4), ENT
*
j, conditional on 
int(α
*
, 1 j N − ), can be defined as the largest element of the set of integer e=(0,1,…, PEj) that 
satisfies the entry condition.  That is,  
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where PEj is the number of potential entrants in industry j.   k j =
* ENT  means that there are k 
new firms that are profitable in a N-firm industry, being N composed by the survivors, 
int(α
*
, 1 j N − ), and newcomers, k.  The substantial implication is that the vector W on (3) can 
now comprise variables measuring incumbents’ entry-deterring strategies.  Furthermore, 
entrants’ profits are still dependent on the number of firms that can profitably compete in the 
industry – N –, but its range is now between int(α
*
, 1 j N − ) and (e+int(α
*
, 1 j N − )).  This 
specification allow us to assess the empirical applicability of various theoretical entry models 
and, hence, to identify which factors are empirically most relevant in the entry decision. 
4. Empirical  Specification   
To apply the entry model to data requires xj, zi and h(δ,W) to be expressed in terms of 
observable variables.  It will be done for the case of Portuguese manufacturing industries.  
Although a number of entry studies have been undertaken in Portugal (Mata, 1991, 1993, 
1996a, 1996b), they mainly applied a standardised methodology and intended to identify 
industry-specific structural characteristics that were likely to impose a deterrent effect on 
entry.  This study, on the contrary, proposes and estimates an entry model that integrates 
explicative factors relating to industry’s environment comprising exogenous, or structural, 
cost and demand conditions, firm-specific characteristics, and incumbents’ strategic 
behaviour towards entry.  Moreover, it does so by using a large panel data that allow us to 
follow each industry over time and applying a more adequate econometric methodology. 
4.1  Specifying Industry-Specific Characteristics 
The industry-specific characteristics that affect entrants' profitability are similar to those 
affecting incumbents' profits.  Thus, we can infer industry-specific characteristics through 
incumbents' profitability.  In particular, based on Schmalensee (1985), who found that 
industry characteristics accounted for about 75 percent of the variation in industry average   9
profitability, industry-specific effects, whatever their nature, on profitability can be proxied 
by a measure of industry average profitability.  Accordingly, we employ the industry-
averaged price-cost margin (PCM) as a proxy of industry specific effects. 
There are at least two reasons in supporting the choice of PCM as a profitability 
measure.  Since price-cost margin has been frequently used in entry studies, its choice allows 
us to make direct comparisons between results obtained in this study and previous works.  
More importantly, when compared with alternative profitability measures, PCM appears to be 
relatively more stable (Baldwin, 1995).  Given that our objective is to measure the specific 
characteristics of each industry that do not vary much over time and are likely to influence 
entrants' expected profits, PCM seems to be the most appropriate proxy for that.  Moreover, as 
PCM captures differences between the value of production and production costs (notably, raw 
materials, labour and electricity), it accounts for industry's costs (as resulting from differences 
in technology) and demand conditions through the level of industry output. 
Despite the relative stability of PCM when compared with alternative profitability 
measures, it is likely to exhibit some inter-temporal variability that may affect entrants' 
expected profits.  If different price-cost margins are associated with different variability on 
profits, their effects on entrants’ expected profits could be similar.  Different price-cost 
margins may have the same effects on entry if the industry's risk is also different.  To control 
for differences on industry risk (RISK), a measure of the observed inter-temporal variability of 
price-cost margin is included as an additional industry characteristic. 
Another industry characteristic that can affect entrants' profitability is expected 
demand growth.  Higher profits are in general expected in growing than in otherwise identical 
industries (Schmalensee, 1989).  Moreover, in growing industries entrants can more easily 
cover the cost of entry without attracting a substantial number of customers away from 
incumbents.  In order to keep our model empirically manageable, we assume that entrants 
have common expectations about demand growth, which are equal to the observed demand 
growth (GROWTH). 
Therefore, we state that potential entrants respond to profitable opportunities inferred 
through industry average profitability, its associated variability and, observed demand 
growth (propositon 1). 
4.2 Firm-Specific  Characteristics 
Before discussing the sources of firms' differences that are likely to affect post-entry 
profitability, we shall consider alternative ways of aggregating firms' characteristics.     10
Basically, our entry model requires some type of aggregation as equation (6) applies at 
industry level, while entry decisions based on equation (3) have been specified for each 
potential entrant and directly dependent on entrants’ specific characteristics. 
The approach chosen is to replace zi in (3) by  j z′, the average value of z across all 
entrants in industry j, measuring firm-specific characteristics of a representative entrant firm.  
The effects of firms' characteristics on entry can be captured through the absolute value of  j z′, 
as it may determine the average level of z required to profitably operate in the industry 
regardless of incumbents' characteristics.  Alternatively, those effects can be captured through 
the ratio between  j z′ and the average value of z across all incumbent firms, which emphasises 
entrants' characteristics relative to those of already established firms.  This is the adopted 
approach, allowing entrant-specific characteristics as well as other firms' characteristics to 
affect entrant’s profits. 
Regarding firms' characteristics, firm-specific resource endowments have been argued 
to be an important factor in determining the ability of firms to compete successfully.  Skilled 
employees, production experience and the capability to innovate and take economic 
advantage of it are frequently listed as important firm-specific resources (cf. Wernerfelt, 
1984; Nelson, 1991).  Demsetz (1973) has already highlighted the role of employee skills in 
deriving firm higher productivity and higher performance as well as reputation, which is 
difficult to separate from the firm itself.  Recently, Röller and Sinclair-Desgagné (1996) stress 
the role of firms’ initial capabilities in affecting firms’ profitability divergences. 
Although the development of firm-specific resources can be associated, among other 
things, with R&D activities and advertising expenditures (for example, in developing brand 
names), the data available is particularly limited in this respect.  Nevertheless, the information 
available to human capital (i.e. employees' characteristics) is particularly rich.  This allows us 
to explore initial employees' skills and schooling as an indicator of the propensity to develop 
firm-specific resources and to adapt to changes in the competitive environment.  Thus, the 
relative share of college graduates among the labour force (GRAD) will be used to measure 
entrants' propensity to create firm-specific resources, which can be associated with 
innovation, management or organisational capabilities.  As this variable measures differences 
in educational background, it can also be thought of as an indicator of the ability to learn 
about their competitive environment and to react successfully to changes in that environment, 
which will be crucial to growth and survival.  In a similar way, the relative share of skilled 
employees (SKILL) is included to measure the ability of entrants to raise their productive   11
efficiency and profitability.  The definition of skilled employee is the one given by the 
Portuguese Ministry of Employment. 
The entry scale (SIZE) is another source of differences among entering firms.  The 
literature on entry has suggested that new firms tend to enter on a small scale if entrants 
intend to avoid incumbents' aggressive behaviour (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  Choosing to 
enter on a small scale, entrants project a friendly image that may reduce the likelihood of 
aggressive response from incumbents to entry (Gelman and Salop, 1983; Sørgard, 1995; 
Thomas, 1999) since the cost of such a response may be higher than its expected benefit.  
They may also choose to be small because they are uncertain about their efficiency and 
profitability.  Being small allows entrants to learn from experience (Jovanovic, 1982) and to 
develop learning abilities (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Pakes and Ericson 1998), which may 
reduce the risk of failure and increase the possibility of growth. 
The scale of entry, on the other hand, is usually seen as a potential source of entrants' 
cost disadvantages compared to incumbents since the existence of scale economies may 
constrain entrants' costs.  If entrants choose an entry scale lower than the minimum efficient 
scale (measured here by the average size of all incumbents), they may be constrained to 
operate with higher costs than scale-efficient firms (Audretsch, 1995).  On the other hand, as 
Audretsch and Yamawaki (1992) shown, sub-optimal scaled plants may overcome the scale-
related disadvantages by deploying and remunerating differently their productive factors; in 
particular by having more flexible and less hierarchical productive and managerial structures, 
or by developing other cost-reducing strategies that compensate their size disadvantages.  If 
entrants can implement such compensatory mechanism, possible size-induced disadvantages 
may not be determinant to their entry mode choice and expected profitability. 
To sum up, we should state that the extent and structure of the labour force at the 
moment of entry and the entry size play a relevant role in deriving superior performance from 
the firm (proposition 2).  Specifically, a high level of graduate employees tends to promote 
the creation of firm-specific resources, notably those associated with the ability to learn about 
and to react successfully to changes in the competitive environment (proposition 2a), and a 
relatively large share of skilled employees may raise productive efficiency and performance 
(proposition 2b).  Furthermore, the choice of the scale of entry takes into account incumbents’ 
potential aggressive response and potential cost disadvantages associated with scale 
(proposition 2c).   12
4.3  Specifying Incumbents' Behaviour and its Relationship with Entry 
From the entrants' viewpoint a crucial factor in evaluating entry profitability is the assessment 
of the incumbents' propensity to respond aggressively in the event of entry.  It is plausible to 
argue that incumbents are in general more able to behave aggressively towards entry when 
they have profitable market positions to be protected.  Yet, since aggressive behaviour needs 
to be funded, more profitable incumbents with surplus funds at their disposal (resulting from 
past profitable operations) may be more protective of their market positions by engaging in 
such strategic activities (Kessides, 1990).  On the other hand, incumbents might find it easier 
to engage in and co-ordinate aggressive behaviour against entrants when they operate in 
concentrated industries where firms' profitability is likely to be strategically linked and the 
free rider problem may be smaller.  Potential entrants observing incumbents' performance and 
the degree of competition in the industry are able to infer such propensity and take it into 
account in their entry decisions. 
We use information on industries' average profitability, measured by the average 
price-cost margin (PCM), and an index of industry concentration (CONC) to assess the 
propensity of incumbents to engage in strategic behaviour towards entry (PROP_STRA).  We 
expect  PROP_STRA to attain high values if incumbents' profitability and industry 
concentration are both high.  Conversely, low industry concentration and/or low incumbents' 
profitability are likely to discourage incumbents from engaging in strategic behaviour, since 
expected benefits from that may not cover its costs and the free rider problem may be an 
important disincentive as well.  Therefore, we define PROP_STRA as the product of PCM and 
CONC, which will only attain high values if both factors are important. 
Another factor that entrants are likely to take into account in assessing expected 
profits is incumbents' entry deterrence strategies.  A wide variety of entry deterrence 
strategies are available to incumbents.  Empirical evidence has already shown that incumbents 
design strategies to protect their market from newcomers (cf. Smiley, 1988; Singh et al. 
1998).  The critical point in any entry-deterring strategy is its credibility, which depends on 
the extent of pre-commitments, leading to sunk costs, and their observation and correct 
assessment by potential entrants (Bonanno, 1988).  In the absence of sunk costs and given 
complete information, deterrence activities may not be credible and may not influence entry 
decisions (Kessides, 1990).   13
Instead of attempting to directly measure sunk costs
3 due to incumbents' strategic 
commitments, past entry and exit rates in the industry were used.  Apart from profit 
considerations on entry decision, entry may occur because it is easy (sunk costs are low) to 
begin operating in the industry.  On the other hand, potential entrants may infer from high exit 
rates that there are reduced losses in case of failure and entry mistakes can costlessly be 
corrected.  Measuring the extent of simultaneous entry and exit we can therefore assess the 
relevance of sunk costs whatever their nature (i.e. exogenous or endogenous, according to 
Sutton’s (1991) terminology).  If past entry and exit are both important, the product of their 
rates will attain high values, which reveal high firm turnover and can be understood as a 
signal of low sunk costs.  By contrast, high sunk costs will yield low entry and exit rates. 
The advantage of considering both entry and exit rates as an indirect measure of sunk 
costs is that both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs are likely to be accounted for, 
although their separate effects cannot be identified.  Since any exit decision is expected to be 
taken by considering entry costs as well as competitive pressure after entry, the effective 
extent of both type of sunk costs determines any exit decision.  Observing the extent of past 
entry and exit rates, potential entrants may infer more accurately the importance of exogenous 
and endogenous irrecoverable costs.  Therefore, we propose to measure the magnitude of 
sunk costs (SUNK) by computing the product of past entry and exit rates, assuming that 
potential entrants take past incumbents' behaviour to predict their actual behaviour in response 
to the threat of entry. 
Unfortunately, the available data prevent us from testing the adoption of specific 
entry-deterring strategies and their effects on entry.  One exception is the possibility of 
exploring the interaction between strategic investment in patenting and branding and entry.  
According to Gilbert and Newberry's (1982) model, incumbents may speed up R&D and 
patenting in response to the threat of entry.  If entrants need to gain a patent to compete in the 
industry, incumbents may deter entry by increasing their R&D and patenting budget in the 
pre-entry period.  Similarly, Schmalensee (1978) argued that incumbents might engage in 
brand proliferation in the pre-entry period to entirely fill up the product space and leave no 
                                                 
3 The role of sunk costs in influencing entry has been subjected to an intensive scrutiny, notably after the contestable markets 
theory had been proposed.  According to this theory, the absence of sunk costs yields an optimal performance and a cost-
minimising market structure.  However, the presence of sunk costs appears to be a very common industry feature, which 
tends to have significant effects on entry (Kessides, 1990).  Examining the impact of sunk costs and market demand on the 
number of innovative companies in the U.S. pesticides industry, Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1998) found a negative 
relationship between sunk costs and the number of firms in the industry.  Despite that, some empirical works have also 
reported weak or non-existent relationships between sunk costs and entry.  Investigating the relationships between entry and 
exit, barriers to entry and sunk cost, Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) concluded that the magnitude of sunk costs does not 
appear to have a significant effect on entry. Studying entry dynamics in Portuguese manufacturing, Mata (1995) reaches 
similar conclusion.   14
profitable market niche to entrants.  To test the possibility of strategic behaviour through 
investment in patenting and branding we include the variable PAT as an explanatory variable.  
It measures the relative importance of patenting and branding expenditures in the pre-entry 
period compared to the average expenditures for the whole sample period. 
Another exception is the possibility of exploring the interaction between capacity 
expansion and entry.  Several studies show how investment at high capacity level could be 
strategically used to deter entry (see, for instance, Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) or Eaton and 
Ware (1987)).  By investing in capacity expansion in the pre-entry period, incumbents can 
expand output and reduce price after entry.  This strategic action will reduce expected profits 
of entrants who may operate on the residual demand.  To test the possibility of strategic 
behaviour through expansion capacity in the pre-entry period, we include the explanatory 
variable EXPCAP, which measures the relative importance of capacity added by incumbents in 
discrete quantities  (i.e. capacity associated with the construction of new plants) to total 
industry capacity. 
Blending all those arguments, our proposition 3 states that as in a concentrated and 
highly profitable context incumbents are likely to react aggressively in the event of entry, 
notably by exploring specific entry-deterring strategies, entrants tend to account for it in their 
assessment of entry profitability.  In particular, high past entry and exit rates are perceived as 
a signal of low irrecoverable (sunk) costs due to incumbents’ less aggressive response, 
rendering entry attractive (proposition 3a), while pre-entry speeding up of investments in 
patenting and branding or capacity expansion can be detrimental to entry (proposition 3b). 
Finally, as ENT
*
j (equation (6)) is conditional to the number of incumbent firms that 
decide to continue operating in an industry, the number of survivors (N) at time 0 is included 
as an explanatory variable.  We should expect that entrants' profits decrease as the number of 
incumbents increases, leading to a reduction on entry (proposition 4). 
5. Empirical  Application 
5.1  Data and Definition of Variables 
The data were mainly obtained from an annual compulsory survey - Quadros de Pessoal 
(henceforth QP) - that has been conducted every year since 1982 by the Portuguese Ministry 
of Employment.  It is reliable micro-data that cover all firms with wage-earning employees 
operating in Portugal and contains abundant information on firms' human capital and on other 
relevant aspects of firms’ characteristics.  No other regularly produced source of statistical   15
information attempts to be as comprehensive as this source.  The identification of each firm is 
done through a unique number that is assigned sequentially on the first report to the survey.  It 
allows firms to be followed over time, conferring to the data a longitudinal dimension.  The 
key procedure, however, is that the same number is never assigned to different firms, 
allowing us to identify new firms by simply comparing firms’ identifiers in each year. 
As some coding errors can occur in such a large database, some data editing 
procedures were performed.  First, information on a firm’s plants were aggregated by the 
main economic activity performed.  This enables us to identify in each year the new firms as 
well as already existent firms that begin to operate in a diversified industry.  The aggregation 
of plants within a firm, according to their main activity, lessens the risk of over-recording due 
to entry of multi-plant firms.  Second, as, theoretically, one firm can be recorded as new in the 
database but not yet operate effectively in the industry, we searched for firms with a positive 
number of employees in a given year and with zero employees or an omitted entry in the 
previous years.  Finally, in the last step the number of entrants is counted for each industry 
and entrants’ characteristics at the moment of entry are measured.  To be recorded as an entry, 
a firm has to fulfil two conditions: (i) to be absent from the raw data files for all years 
previous to the year it was firstly spotted, and (ii) to record a positive number of employees to 
exclude entry without creation of a new production unit. 
Complementary data on the gross value of production, total wages, value added, and 
expenditure on patents and brands come from published industrial statistics.  Conditional on 
the coverage of these statistics, 134 industries were observed over 6 years.  Table 1 presents 
the empirical distribution of the number of entrants, showing interesting features of the entry 
data.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Firstly, over the observed period, zero is the modal, most frequent value, implying that 
a significant number of industries did not effectively attract new firms at some point in the 
sample period.  Moreover, the median value is between one and two, which suggest a great 
concentration of zero and one observations. Overall, entry is not a highly frequent 
phenomenon, although there are some highly attractive industries, recording a large number 
of entrants.  The sparseness of tail responses is also clear from Table 1, mainly caused by a 
group of a few highly attractive industries such as clothing and footwear and leather products.  
Secondly, the variance significantly exceeds the mean, motivating a careful choice of the 
econometric approach.  Finally, despite the large range of values recorded and the long right   16
tail of the distribution, nearly 80% of observations record 10 or less entrants.  These features 
of the entry data guide us to employ count data models in analysing entry. 
Theoretical arguments and data availability lie behind the definition of the explanatory 
variables.   Table 2 reveals definitions as well as some descriptive statistics of the constructed 
explanatory variables.  As one knows the year of entry but is interested in the variables that 
affect an entry decision, one has to take into account the time between entry decision and the 
year when entry effectively occurs.  Based on empirical evidence cited and analysed by 
Schwartz (1986), which suggests that the entry response to profit opportunities only occurs 
after a lag of time, the explanatory variables related to profit opportunities are computed as 3-
year lagged variables.  Ghemawat (1984, 1987), who reports that large chemical industry 
plants take at least four years to build and assumes that a typical industrial plant takes two-
three years to build, also corroborates the time-lag choice.  The remaining variables have been 
put back one period in accordance to the main assumptions of our entry model; in particular, 
the sequential decision assumption in which first incumbents decide whether or not stay 
operating in the industry and then potential entrants take their entry decisions, and the 
informational assumption in which decisions are based on the information available at time 0.  
These assumptions and the resulting one-period lag intend to mitigate potential endogeneity 
problems due to the role entrants may play in the incumbent’s decision. This was the most 
feasible alternative to deal with potential endogeneity as appropriate instruments for the 
number of remaining incumbents are difficult to find, making impossible to deal 
econometrically with it. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
As the descriptive statistics reveal, the industries are very heterogeneous.  In terms of 
profitability they vary between a negative profitability (-24.715%) and a positive profitability 
of more than 50%, whereas the risk associated with each industry is less changeable. The 
other industry-specific variables also vary substantially; for example, the 3-year lagged 
average growth varies between –9.7% and 96.2%.  This is consistent with the observed 
variability on entry patterns (Table 3) and entry rates (Figure 1).  In almost all industries the 
maximum value of entry was record in 1988 or 1989, suggesting that the number of entrants 
is increasing over time.  More interestingly, during the observed period there are no changes 
on the group of highly attractive industries and the group of lowly attractive industries, 
though the variability on entry rates is not negligible.  Despite their absolute values of entry, 
industries such as chemical products, textiles and food and beverage record a considerable 
relative turnover of firms.   17
INSERT TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 1 HERE 
5.2 Econometric  Modelling 
The non-negativity and discrete features of entry data suggest the use of count data models, 
which literature has evolved quite rapidly.  The standard count data model is the Poisson 
regression model, which allows inference to be drawn on the probability of event occurrence.  
Denoting ENTj as the number of entrants in industry j, j = 1, 2, ..., n, in a given year, its 
probability function is given by 




j j P j j y
exp




= = = ENT ,      yj = 0, 1, 2, .... and λj > 0,  (7)
  where yj is the realised value of the random variable ENTj, and λj is its expected number. 
Observed heterogeneity among industries is introduced by parameterizing 
( ) () β λ j j j j exp E x x = = ENT       j = 1, 2,....,n  (8) 
where xj is a (1×K) vector of exogenous variables and β a conformable vector of coefficients. 
The presence of overdispersion, a situation in which the variance exceeds the mean, is 
a feature of the entry data, resulting in a larger variance of the estimator than predicted by the 
Poisson model, as well as in a possible loss of efficiency (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 
1995).  Note that the evidence of overdispersion is a prevalent condition in entry studies (see, 
among others, Chappell et al. (1990)), which may be due to unobserved heterogeneity in the 
mean function.  To account for this, often a random variable (uj) is added to the mean 
function, assuming that it is uncorrelated with the exogenous variables.  The mean function is 
now given by 
() ( ) j j j j j j j exp u exp
~
ε λ ε β β λ = = + = x x .  (9) 
Different distributional assumptions for ui lead to different compound Poisson models.  The 
standard compound Poisson model is the negative binomial model (Negbin) that assumes uj as 
following a gamma distribution. 
The data used in this paper comprise repeated observations of the sampled industries.  
If the longitudinal aspect of the data is not accounted for, one can employ these cross-section 
count data models, presuming that unobserved heterogeneity is industry and time varying.  
Conversely, the unobserved heterogeneity may result from industry-specific effects that 
induce observations within industries to be correlated over time.  In this context, random-
effects (RE) or fixed-effects (FE) models are applied, differing on the econometric treatment 
of industry-specific effects.  Winkelmann (1997) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998) offer a   18
useful an insightful discussion on cross-section and panel count data models. 
5.3 Results 
The overall explanatory power of covariates is quite high.  The R
2
d measure attains a value 
above 0.9, providing evidence that the covariates highly explain the observed entry flow.  The 
significant and positive value of σ
2, both in the pooled Negbin model and RE Poisson model, 
shows that, even conditional on explanatory variables, the variance of ENTj significantly 
exceeds the mean, corroborating the evidence of overdispersion illustrated in Table 1. 
Moreover, this leads us to focus our attention mainly on FE and RE models that control for 
industry-specific effects, forming the time varying variation in the explanatory variables the 
basis for the panel estimation results. Note however that there are no substantial differences in 
terms of sign and significance between estimates yielded by RE and FE Poisson models and 
by RE and FE Negbin models, controlling the latter for unobserved heterogeneity in a more 
complex manner. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The estimated results seem to suggest that potential entrants take into account in their 
entry decisions industry average profitability and, to a lesser degree, its temporal variation.  
Holding everything else constant, potential entrants are more likely to take an entry decision 
in profitable industries.  However, the speed of entry in response to profitable opportunities 
seems to be fairly slow.  The estimate associated with PCM is approximately 0.03, suggesting 
that an increase of one point on the 3-years lagged average price-cost margins induces an 
increase on the entry flow of around 3%, ceteris paribus.  Bearing in mind that around 60% of 
the sampled industries observe an entry flow of less than 4 new firms each year, the expected 
industry profitability needs to rise considerably to provoke a noticeable increase in the entry 
flow.  The attraction effect inherent to profitable industries is higher in growing than in 
otherwise identical industries.  This result appears to indicate that, holding everything else 
constant, in growing industries entrants can more easily cover the entry costs and be 
successful without provoking aggressive behaviour by incumbents than in otherwise identical 
industries.  Furthermore, the significantly positive effect of industry growth on entry seems to 
indicate that it is mostly absorbed by new firms entry rather than by expansion of incumbents.  
Overall, it is in agreement with the conventional wisdom in which potential entrants monitor 
these variables as a signal of opportunities open to them, confirmed in several empirical 
studies (see, among others, Kessides (1990), Chappell et al. (1990), Mayer and Chappell 
(1992), Mata (1993), Fotopoulos and Spence (1999)).   19
We find evidence that the ease of entry and exit from an industry, as an indirect 
measure of irrecoverable (sunk) costs, is significant in shaping the intensity of competition 
brought to an industry by newcomers.  Once one controls for industry time-invariant specific 
effects, high rates of entry and exit are statistically significant in lowering entry flow.  It 
appears counterintuitive at least at first glance.  One would expect that high values of SUNK, 
which are reached only when both past entry and exit rates are high, might be understood as a 
signal of low sunk costs and thereby convey a signal that entry is easy and costlessly 
reversible, as the theory of contestable industries postulates.  If so, a positive relationship 
would be expected between the observed entry pattern and the variable SUNK, but it occurs 
only on the pooled regressions. 
However, as the control for industry time-invariant specific effects makes the 
correction for variation in fixed entry costs across industries (Geroski, 1995), the effect on 
entry is due to the time varying variation in the variable SUNK, reflecting the abnormal degree 
of turbulence in a given industry.  Entrants may perceive it as a signal that entry may be 
relatively easy, but survival is not.  Periods of high entry and exit appear to be followed by 
periods of low entry, suggesting that if entry attempts are predestined to failure, regardless of 
the degree of losses that may be involved, then few firms will find entry appealing.  Another 
plausible argument, though related to the previous one, is that potential entrants may 
recognize simultaneous high entry and exit rates as the effect of incumbents’ post-entry 
aggressive behaviour, which may not be credibly taken by previous entering firms.  If so, high 
intensity in entry and exit movements may currently strengthen the credibility of incumbents’ 
entry-deterring strategies, regardless of their nature, which are more likely to be accounted for 
by actual prospective entrants in evaluating their entry success. 
The effect of the relative share of college graduate employees among the labour force 
(GRAD) is statistically insignificant.  At first glance, we may be tempted to conclude that we 
do not find evidence to support the proposition that a high level of graduate employees tends 
to promote the creation of firm-specific resources, notably those associated with the ability to 
learn about and react successfully to changes in the competitive environment (proposition 2a).  
However, the weak results associated with GRAD may well be understood in the context of the 
Portuguese labour market during the 80’s.  During the sample period, which is fully 
encompassed on the 80’s, the supply of highly educated employees in the Portuguese labour 
market was quite small.  Only at the end of the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s we observe 
a significant growth in the vacancies opened by Portuguese universities and the subsequent 
increase in the stock of graduate employees.  This inflicted a decisive constraint on firms’   20
entry mode choice.  Thus, the insignificant effect on entry may reflect the inability of firms to 
freely hire graduate employees rather than a scenario in which they do not value the 
employment of graduate employees as a strategy to improve performance and survival. 
A plausible argument corroborating that explanation is the strong significance and the 
positive sign of the relative share of skilled employees (SKILL).  It suggests that entrants 
choose the structure of their labour force as an important firm-specific resource.  Firms that 
have chosen a relatively high share of skilled employees are more likely to enter than 
otherwise identical firms.  It seems to indicate that they value their capabilities underlying the 
human capital structure as a way to raise their productive efficiency and performance, 
confirming our proposition 2b. 
It is interesting that when we compare the effects of human capital related variables 
with profit opportunities variables, the former appear to have a greater effect on entry than the 
latter.  In particular, an increase of one point in the relative share of skilled employees of the 
firms that each year contemplate entry is likely to induce an increase on entry of around 9%, 
ceteris paribus, while a similar variation in the average pre-entry profitability appears to 
provoke a smaller effect on entry, around 3%.  Bearing this comparison in mind, entrants 
seem to follow more strictly their own capabilities in assessing their potential success in a 
given industry rather than the average capabilities of their actual rivals. 
It is also interesting that entry scale (measured by SIZE), despite its strong 
significance, captures mixed results.  Based on estimated results from the pooled Poisson 
model, SIZE appears to have a negative effect on entry, suggesting that entrants tend to opt for 
being small as a way to avoid incumbents’ aggressive response to entry even so possible size-
induced disadvantages may not be easily overcome.  Conversely, once one control for 
industry time-invariant specific effects (FE and RE models), the effect of entry scale on entry 
appears to be positive, suggesting that firms do not fear incumbents’ response and the 
potential risk of failure, choosing a large scale as a way to shape favourably their expected 
profits.  In that case, large firms would be the most active group with respect to entry moves,  
reflecting firms’ concern to choose an efficient entry scale instead of to choose a 
technologically unconstrained entry size.  Conditional on the variation on fixed entry costs 
across industries, firms tend to enter on a scale that allows them to operate efficiently, even 
though this may imply choosing a large scale.  The concern apparently devoted to efficient 
scale might be taken as an indication of the value attained by potential entrants to potential 
size-induced cost-disadvantages.  In fact, if economies of scale act as a barrier to entry, as 
some empirical works on entry have suggested (see, among others, Duetsch (1984), Chappell   21
et al. (1990), Mata (1993), Fotopoulos and Spence (1999)), only firms that are able to 
overcome such barriers are likely to enter.  The focus on economies of scale gives some 
support to the finding that firms who are more likely to enter are those that have chosen a 
comparatively large entry scale. 
The strongly significant negative coefficient associated with PROP_STRA confirms our 
proposition that entrants use their perceptions of incumbents’ performance and degree of 
competition in an industry to infer the propensity of incumbents’ strategic behaviour towards 
entry, thereby taking it into account in their entry decisions (proposition 3).  More 
specifically, highly concentrated and profitable industries are the least attractive industries to 
potential entrants, as they seem to ascribe a significantly higher probability of incumbents 
reacting aggressively in the event of entry.  However, this finding is only obtained once one 
control for time-invariant industry-specific effects.  This may well explain the mixed and 
often rather imprecise evidence found in previous empirical works on entry since most of 
them have adopted a cross-section methodology.  In particular, for the Portuguese case, Mata 
(1993) argues that previous works for Portugal led to the rejection of the hypothesis that fear 
of aggressive behaviour would deter entry.  But again, his conclusion is based on estimated 
results from cross-section models.  Comparing the consistency and robustness of our results 
with those previously obtained, remarkably from empirical studies using a similar sample of 
industries, we have to reckon on the superior performance and adequacy of panel data 
methodology for modelling and researching sectoral entry.   
Another relevant difference that may explain those dissimilarities is the way the 
empirical variable PROP_STRA was computed.  Previous studies have frequently used only 
industry concentration levels as a proxy for the propensity of incumbents’ aggressive 
behaviour, arguing that firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to overcome 
the free-rider problem, thereby more likely to react aggressively.  They have nonetheless 
neglected the needs of funding associated with such aggressive behaviour, which tend to be 
significant and only available to profitable incumbents with surplus funds at their disposal.  
Moreover, even in highly concentrated industries, incumbents’ propensity to engage in 
aggressive behaviour is expected only if they have profitable industry positions to protect 
from other firms.  Thus, such propensity is clearly triggered off by the joint effect of both 
factors (industry concentration level and profitability) and not by only one of them, though 
high industry concentration levels are frequently correlated with high profitability. 
The results also show that, holding everything else constant, larger industries attract 
more entrants than small ones, indicating a follower-type behaviour as entrants are more   22
likely to choose an industry populated by a medium or large number of firms than industries 
with a relatively concentrated structure.  This finding also confirms the indication that 
entrants use their perceptions of the degree of competition in an industry, highly correlated 
with the industry’s size, to infer the propensity of incumbents to engage in strategic behaviour 
towards entry and therefore to rationally decide whether to enter or not.  The value of the 
estimated industry’s size elasticity offers an additional insight; as this value is approximately 
1, entry appears to perpetuate the pattern of specialisation of the Portuguese manufacturing 
industry. 
The estimates results yield statistically insignificant coefficients associated with the 
variables PAT and EXPCAP, which are the only two explanatory variables uniquely devoted to 
capturing the effects on entry due to specific entry-deterring strategies.  This seems to indicate 
that potential entrants infrequently take into account in their entry assessment the use of 
speeding up investments in capacity or patenting and branding to either deter or react to entry.  
They do seem to be unresponsive to those two sorts of strategies, which are ineffective in 
deterring entry. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to provide a more complete picture of how industry features, firm-
specific characteristics, and strategic actions towards entry are related to entry behaviour.  The 
chief objective is, using data from a set of industries, to find regularities on incumbents’ 
response towards entry and the role of initial entrants’ characteristics, which may be of 
considerable value to either industry analysts or policy-makers. 
Overall, the empirical results are quite encouraging, suggesting that both incumbents’ 
behaviour and firm-specific characteristics provide additional insights in understanding entry.  
Moreover, when compared with other empirical studies using a similar sample of industries, 
the consistency and robustness of the results confirm the superior performance and adequacy 
of panel data methodology for modelling and researching sectoral entry. 
The weak results related to entry-deterrent strategies hinge on the difficult to find 
empirical measures of incumbents’ strategic behaviour.  Even in the case of statistically 
significant coefficients associated with variables related to the adoption of entry-deterring 
strategies, the empirical results only reveal a correlation between entry and those variables but 
not whether incumbents divert from a profit maximizing behaviour.  To address this issue, a 
substantial amount of cost information is required and, therefore, this issue is left to future   23
work.  Moreover, one might not find robust and consistent evidence on the adoption of entry-
deterring strategies without a direct and explicitly oriented observation of firms’ reaction to 
entry.  Alternatively, one could follow the Singh et al. (1998) data collection approach that 
uses a questionnaire to enquire from firms whether they adopt entry-deterring strategies and, 
if so, what strategies are more frequently adopted.  The evidence on incumbents deviating 
from a profit- maximising behaviour may nonetheless be difficult to support. 
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Counts    1984 1985  1986  1987  1988  1989    1984-1989 
0   28.4  33.6  32.1  34.3  28.4  23.9    30.1 
1   17.2  19.4  18.7  18.7  18.7  15.7    18.0 
2   9.0  8.2  9.7  9.0 5.2  16.4   9.6 
3   6.7  10.4  8.2  2.2 9.7 6.7   7.3 
4   6.0  6.0  2.2  5.2 3.7 2.2   4.2 
5   6.0  2.2  5.2  6.0 4.5 6.0   5.0 
6   2.2  2.2  2.2  3.7 6.0 1.5   3.0 
7   3.0  1.5  2.2  -  1.5  3.0    1.9 
8   3.0  3.0  2.2  0.7  -  3.0    2.0 
9   0.7  1.5  0.7  2.2 2.2 4.5   2.0 
10   1.5  -  1.5  1.5  0.7  0.7    1.0 
>10 and ≤20   8.3  3.9  4.6  6.0 8.3 5.6   6.0 
>20 and ≤50   5.0  5.1  7.5  6.7 5.3 5.2   5.8 
>50   3.0  3.0  3.0  3.8 5.8 5.8   4.0 
                  
Observations   134  134  134  134  134  134    804 
Maximum   187  212  312  465  554  485    554 
Mean   8.0  6.8  9.1  11.1  12.8  12.9    10.1 
Variance   433.6  450.2  961.0  1908.5  2610.8  2156.6    1416.7 
Mean
Variance  
  54.3 66.3  106.0  172.6  204.0  166.8    140.3 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal; Author’s calculations.   26





Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Entry  Number of new firms at end of each year. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment. 
 
10.106 37.639  0  554 
PCM  3-year lagged average of price cost margins (i.e. 
average of price cost margin from period t-3 until t-
1).  The price cost margin is calculated as (Value 
added-Total wages)/(Gross value of production), all 
measured at the end of each year. 
Source: Estatísticas Industriais, INE. 
 
14.803 9.430 -24.715  59.815 
RISK  3-year lagged standard deviation of price cost-
margins. 
Source: Estatísticas Industriais, INE. 
 
3.571 2.950 0.0463  18.633 
GROWTH  3-year lagged average of production growth rate 
before entry. 
Source: Estatísticas Industriais, INE. 
 
22.662 12.308 -9.663 96.222 
PAT  One year lagged of the deviation of the expenditures 
in patenting and branding from its long-run average 
value, i.e. the average value for whole sample 
period. 
Source: Estatísticas Industriais, INE. 
 
-0.181 1.194  -1  10 
N  The logarithmic of the number of incumbent firms at 
time t-1 that decide to stay operating in the industry. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment. 
 
3.742 1.583  0  8.009 
PROP_STRA  One year lagged of the price cost margin multiplied 
by an index of industry concentration. 
Source: Estatísticas Industriais, INE and Quadros de 
Pessoal, Ministry of Employment 
 
9.182 10.451  -11.284  65.770 
SUNK   Product of the rate of entry and the rate of exit at the 
end of year t-1. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment 
 
0.232 0.602  0  11.111 
EXPCAP  Ratio of the capacity added in discrete quantities in 
the year t (i.e. capacity associated with the 
construction of new plant) to the total capacity in the 
previous year.  The total number of employees 
measures the capacity available or added in an 
industry. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment 
 
0.873 5.450  0  98.112 
GRAD  The average of the ratio of the number of graduate 
employees to the total number employees of entrant 
firms, normalised by incumbents’ average. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment 
 
0.994 3.213  0  60.357 
SKILL  The average of the ratio of the number of skilled 
employees to the total number employees of entrant 
firms, normalised by incumbents’ average. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment 
 
0.646 0.799  0  15.532 
SIZE  The entrants' average size at the end of each year.  
The total number of employees measures the size of 
entrant firms, normalised by incumbents’ average. 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, Ministry of Employment 
 
0.503 0.987  0  21.562 
   27
Table 3: Number of new firms per 3-digit industries over the period 1984-1989 
Codes  Description  of  3-digit  industries  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average 
311, 312, 
313  Food and beverage   118  106 117 125 137 140 123.8 
314  Tobacco  0 0 0 0 0 0  0.0 
321 Textiles  78 84 89  117  147  155 111.7 
322, 323  Clothing  189 214 313 465 554 487 370.3 
324  Footwear and leather products  89  79 140 153 160 147 128.0 
331  Wood and cork  81 98  112  132  148  159 121.7 
332 Furniture  106  67 103 113 113 141 107.2 
341  Paper  4 4 6 4 2  10 5.0 
342  Publishing and printing  57  38  36 47 61 89 54.7 
351, 352  Chemical products  23  17  19  16  26 19 20.0 
353  Oil refineries and products derived from oil 
and coal  0 0 0 0 0 0  0.0 
355, 356  Rubber and plastic products  38  19 37 30 35 41 33.3 
361  Porcelain, glazed and painted pottery  24  17 25 44 52 58 36.7 
362, 369  Glass and other non-metal minerals  78  41 57 70 73 86 67.5 
 Basic  metals  18  12 17 15 25 17 17.3 
381 Metallic  products,  except machines and 
transporting materials  54  34 52 58 51 57 51.0 
382 Non-electrical  machines  48  34 54 50 69 60 52.5 
383 Electrical  machines  25  22 24 22  31 30 25.7 
384 Transport  equipment  29 19  5 13 22 21 18.2 
385  Scientific and professional tools  8 3 4 4 2 6  4.5 
390  Other manufacturing industries  4  2 5 4 7 9 5.2 
 Total  1071  910 1215 1482 1715 1732   
Legend:      Minimum value;      Maximum value. 





















































Figure 1: Box-plots of the number of entrants by 3-digit industries   28
Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of regression coefficients along with standard errors 
   Poisson   Negbin 
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0.1931*** 
(0.0342)   
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  -   -   -      -   
7.9551*** 
(1.6500) 
                     
ln L    -2091.7   -1100.2   -1548.7   -1580.5   -1068.7    -1524.2 
R
2
d    0.9183                 
Sample    804   804   804   804   804    804 
               
Legend:  Pooled: the data is assumed to be a long cross-section data; FE: fixed effects model; RE: random effects model.  In the case of RE Poisson model, the industry-specific effects were specified as being 
drawn form a gamma distribution with parameters (σ
-2, σ
-2), while, in the case of RE Negbin model, industry-specific effects are assumed to be distributed as a Beta(a,b). R
2
d:: the deviance R
2 proposed by 
Cameron and Windmeijer (1996). 
Notes:  Standard errors in parenthesis.  Based on t-values, *,  ** and *** mean that coefficients are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.   Working Papers - NIMA series
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